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Futurescapes of urban regeneration: ten years of design for the
unfolding urban legacy of London’s Olympic Games, 2008–2018
Juliet Davis
Welsh School of Architecture, Cardiﬀ University, Cardiﬀ, Wales
ABSTRACT
Much of the literature on the urban legacy of the 2012 Olympics Games emerging
in recent years has emphasized the form that development has taken and the
ways in which this aligns (or not) with speciﬁc promises made in terms of
regeneration before the Games. Though plenty of discussion of planning
procedure has occurred in this context, less emphasis has been placed on how
the process, rather than the products, of urban change has been envisioned
through legacy planning and urban design, and the signiﬁcance of this for
regeneration. Given that London’s much-heralded ‘regeneration legacy’ was,
from the early days of the Olympic bid, portrayed as a long-term process aimed
at addressing historical issues of socio-economic disparity in East London, and
that planning and urban design would play key roles in anticipating it, this
contribution to the literature is timely. The paper focuses on the period from
2008 to 2018, beginning with the launch of the what was called the Legacy
Masterplan Framework. Drawing on empirical analysis of documents describing
the main stages of legacy planning and design between these years, it then
examines how regeneration as a ‘futurescape’ encompassing numerous aspects






The past decade has witnessed the production of a great deal of literature related to the regeneration
legacy of London’s 2012 Olympics. Of that which relates speciﬁcally to urban design and develop-
ment aspects, much has focussed on the products of anticipated and/or realized regeneration – on
what is designed to be or actually delivered by way of public amenities, housing, employment
areas, cultural spaces and the like.1 Less has been written on how regeneration has been anticipated
as a process in the context of legacy plans – involving diﬀerent stages and timings – and, indeed, on
how that process, through design, has been unfolding in time.2 This reﬂects a broader tendency in
regeneration studies to emphasize the physical and spatial aspects of planned change at the expense
of the temporal aspects of transformation.3
Ideas of process have, however, been important in the context of designs for London’s Olympics
and legacy since the days of the Olympic Bid in 2003–4. It was then that the concept of a transform-
able Games landscape that could develop over time into a mixed-use ‘piece of city’ was ﬁrst formed.
Exemplifying a neoliberal conception of how to instigate and stimulate urban change,4 the Games
were seen to have the potential to create valuable ‘catalysts’ to market-led development in and
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around the Olympic site after 2012 that the Labour Party Mayor of London Ken Livingstone prom-
ised in 2007 would ‘transform the heart of East London’.5 When the ﬁrst major plan for this urban
legacy, the Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMF), was launched in 2008, this transformative process
was expected to stretch from the Games in 2012 to 2031.
A challenge for the appointed masterplanning team was hence to envision the legacy products as
unfolding over this timeframe. As the economic, political and social contexts of development evolve
continually and often in unanticipated ways, any plan formed so early in the process would be at risk
of becoming dated and/or unfeasible. In response, the team developed a range of strategies in
response to the uncertainty of the distant future and related to how the process might unfold, gradu-
ally realizing regeneration. Though the masterplan was renamed, and certain directions shifted in
2010, these broadly formed the basis for outline planning approval in 2011–12.
The main aim of this paper is to explore how planning and development processes were antici-
pated before the Olympics in the context of masterplanning, shaping strategies between January
2008 and July 2012 and also how they have been unfolding and continued to be anticipated since
(July 2012-July 2018). It considers the relation between the two periods and how eﬀective earlier
strategies have been in both anticipating and laying the ground for later processes. In so doing, it
also aims to consider the signiﬁcance of these anticipated and unfolding processes for understanding
the nature and politics of event-led urban change in East London. The paper’s contribution to the
existing literature on London’s legacy is two-fold. First, it extends the focus of other histories dealing
with the planning of the Olympics and legacy to the present year of writing.6 Second, it oﬀers a new
perspective on the history of masterplanning and the production of legacy over a ten year period
which other studies, with their typically stronger focus on the spatial products and socio-material
impacts of development, have not provided to date.
Planning and urban design histories are inescapably histories of futures. But to write a history
focussed on how a process of transformation has been anticipated and also unfolded over ten
years requires careful consideration of the nature of processes and a framework for analysis. The
concept of a ‘futurescape’ elaborated by the social theorist Barbara Adam oﬀers helpful resources
for doing so, providing a range of ways of characterizing the structure and temporality of processes
and considering how, as futures, they are anticipated and made.7
The paper that follows is divided into several sections. It begins by outlining the concept of a ‘future-
scape’. It then shifts to consider the planning context for the legacymasterplans, focussing on keyways
in which the process of regeneration was laid out in the context of planning policy and early Olympic
and legacymasterplans between 2003 and 2007. Drawing on empirical analysis of documents describ-
ing the main stages of legacy planning and design between 2008 and 2018, the remainder of the paper
comprises three further sections. The ﬁrst and second consider the period between 2008 and 2012,
focussing respectively on how processes of change and development, as ‘futurescapes,’ were antici-
pated and informed strategy in the context of the LMF and later Legacy Communities
Scheme (LCS). The third section focuses on the period 2013–2018 in which legacy became the
focus of procurement and materialization and new plans were produced within the framework estab-
lished by the LCS. Collectively, they consider how ideas of process have shaped design strategies at
diﬀerent stages, how process has unfolded to date and how this is signiﬁcant for regeneration.
A futurescapes perspective on legacy and regeneration
The notion of a ‘futurescape’ is developed in BarbaraAdam’s work to describe a particular approach to
the study of futures across varied realms of social practice. Broadly, it encompasses a conception of
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futures as always ‘involve[ing] a number of irreducible elements’ that describe them not just as things
but as processes unfolding through and beyond the present while, at the same time, an understanding
that futures are constructed and producedwithin speciﬁc social and spatial contexts (or ‘scapes’).8 The
‘structural elements’ of futurity, she suggests, may encompass broad, cultural conceptions of the
future – for example, the idea emerging in the context of the European Enlightenment and the rise
of capitalism of the future as ‘open’ to human shaping rather than as predetermined by a divine
power9 – along with a range of concepts that relate to the temporal positioning and dynamics of
processes.
First, futures may be anticipated or planned to unfold within speciﬁc timeframes which are
‘bounded’, measurable chunks of time. In the context of regeneration, timeframe may denote the
period allocated to the process as a whole and/ or to diﬀerent events or activities within it. In
turn, how processes are structured often involves the identiﬁcation of speciﬁc timings and/or time
sequences. In development contexts, phases, for example, denote ways in which the activities of
design, planning and construction are anticipated to interact and follow on from one another.
They are often timed to facilitate completion within an overall project timeframe – in other
words, set to start and end at particular moments or time-points.
Sometimes, the deﬁnition of such timingsmay be done to achieve a synchronization of activities – a
strategy which will be shown to have been important throughout legacy planning. Futures can also be
described in terms of their duration – the time, in other words, in which they are expected to exist, last
or persist before yielding to the present or to other futures. The phases of development can clearly be
described in terms of duration, but so too can development itself, which may be temporary or perma-
nent to a greater or lesser degree. Processesmay be described in terms of tempowhich relates, as Adam
puts it, to the ‘speed, pace and intensity’ at which activities are conducted.10 Thus, it is possible to refer
to the speed of envisioned change which may connect to anticipated economic ﬂows, risk-manage-
ment strategies and/or eﬃciency-drives, as recent scholars of capitalist time and speed suggest.11
But lastly, and in contrast to these diﬀerent measures of time, temporality draws attention to the
general position of activities within processes relative to one another – to what precedes versus
what comes after, or to what is nearer or farther – and to how things unfold through the passage of
time, such as by ageing, growing or, indeed, regenerating. Temporality hence, oﬀers an important
way of describing processes and temporal relations in terms other than explicit clock-times.
This structuring of futures-as-processes relies, as Adam argues, on ‘knowledge practices’ that
enable futures to be understood as certain or uncertain, determinate or indeterminate and the like
from a current standpoint and charted as ‘present futures.’12 But, as Raco et al suggest, deﬁning tim-
ings within planning and development contexts is also an ‘inherently political process’ as, within any
project, diﬀerent actors and stakeholders have diﬀerent conceptions of what should be delivered
when, possess diﬀerent sorts of knowledge, diﬀerent goals and diﬀerent capacities to legitimise
and bring urban futures about.13 When design and development are stretched over decades, as is
the case with London’s Olympic legacy, there is a potential for the process to be continually subject
to contestation. This, as will be shown, creates speciﬁc challenges for design as a practice typically
engaged in anticipating and guiding the production of urban futures.
We now turn to the history of legacy masterplanning, drawing on the various structural elements
of the ‘futurescapes’ concept to explore how the process of Olympic-led regeneration has been antici-
pated, planned and unfolded. The research leading to this began at the start of the period under
study, in 2007. The research process has involved using a variety of techniques including reading
and analysing planning policy, planning committee minutes and design strategies, conducting
semi-structured interviews with a range of actors involved in masterplanning between 2007 and
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2017, attendance at numerous public engagement workshops and site visits. Participants in inter-
views included senior architects at the masterplanning ﬁrms, directors of design, planning and devel-
opment working within key organizations including the London Development Agency (LDA),
Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC) and London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC).
The analysis begins with a brief background to the legacy masterplanning process beginning in
2008, concentrating on how the process of regeneration was established in earlier stages of planning
between 2003 and 2007.
Regeneration, East London and the Olympics 2003–2007
The site for London’s Olympic Games, which lies as the cusp between the four London Boroughs of
Hackney, Tower Hamlets, Waltham Forest and Newham in the Lower Lea Valley, was ﬁrst
Figure 1. The Olympic Site in the context of London’s Lower Lea Valley Opportunity Area (author, 2014).
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earmarked as strategic for regeneration in the mid-1990s (Figure 1). However, it was not until the
creation of the Greater London Authority (GLA) in 2000, which transformed capacities to plan stra-
tegically for large sites at the interface of local authorities, that plans began to take shape. Through
the production of its ﬁrst statutory plan for the city (published in 2004), the whole of East London
was identiﬁed as ‘the priority area’ for planning and development.14 Within it, the Lower Lea Valley
was identiﬁed as an Opportunity Area becoming a key focus for processes of accommodating Lon-
don’s anticipated population increase and of post-industrial regeneration.15
The regeneration process described within the London Plan is long-term (though a speciﬁc time-
frame is not given), requiring strategic plans, public investments in transport infrastructure and
other initiatives to ‘catalyse’ development. The Olympics, then the focus of a Bid for the 2012
Games, are portrayed as key to this process by ‘levering resources, spurring timely completion of
already programmed infrastructure’ and setting a deadline (or time point) for development that
would help streamline the planning process.16 They would also put in place amenities and infrastruc-
tures that would, in theory, beneﬁt existing communities while attracting investors and creating
property-led solutions to urban decline, reﬂecting a characteristically neoliberal planning policy
involving the use of megaevents to stimulate market-led processes of urban change.17
Once the Games had been awarded to London, the attentions of the GLA and London 2012
quickly turned to developing strategies for bringing these goals about, including the acquisition of
necessary land, the establishment of new governance arrangements and the production of master-
plans. Two masterplans – one for the Games and another called the Olympic Legacy Transformation
Masterplan – were commissioned in 2005. The ﬁrst was concerned with composing the stage-set for
the Games, which was envisioned from the outset as made up of elements of diﬀerent durations –
from permanent venues understood as capable of providing long-term amenity value to temporary
structures that would serve the needs of the event and its ‘celebratory,’ short-term, market-attracting
machinery.18 The second dealt, hence, with the dismantling of temporary structures after the Games
to free up land for long-term mixed-use urban development and the adaptation of parklands and
infrastructure to create local public spaces. Together, they articulated the relationship between the
Games and the start of legacy in terms of a sequence of transformative processes.
Though the London Development Agency (LDA) – the functional arm of the GLA charged with
driving sustainable economic growth in London – was given the power to acquire the land necessary
for the Games, a process legitimized by claims of the beneﬁt that they would bring, the production of
the masterplans was led by the new Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), which was also granted
planning authority over the site up until 2013.19 The arrangement reﬂects a frequently observed ten-
dency of neoliberal planning authorities to delegate the making of growth-oriented urban futures to
non-elected, entrepreneurial quangos informed by business-models of eﬃciency and
competitiveness.20
The timing of the launch of these masterplans was designed to ensure not only completion of the
Olympic stage in good time for the Games, but the eﬃcient transformation of the site just a year later,
in 2013. What would be achieved within just eight years, LDA planners claimed, would transform
the tempo of regeneration, massively ‘accelerating what would have been possible without the
Games’ and the constitution of new powers that it enabled, highlighting important assumptions
about the relationship between urban governance and the temporality of change.21
Executed by a design consortium led by the planning and design consultancy EDAW, the plans
were awarded outline planning approval in 2007. Under the terms of the permission, the LDA, as the
current site owner, was obliged to prepare a Legacy Masterplan Framework for the longterm, focuss-
ing on the areas vacated by the temporary developments, as soon as possible. We now go on to
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consider how regeneration was anticipated by LMF masterplanners and the design strategies devel-
oped in response.
The Legacy Masterplan Framework 2008–2010
The LMF was launched in January 2008 following the appointment of a masterplanning consortium
made up of three ﬁrms. London based EDAW (Eckbo, Williams, Dean and Austin (since renamed as
AECOM)) represented continuity from earlier stages in the legacy visioning, having been involved
since 2002. London-based Allies and Morrison (A&M) were already involved in masterplanning the
Games – and later were involved the temporary overlay and legacy transformation – hence repre-
senting continuity across diﬀerent phases of Olympic and legacy design. Rotterdam-based Kees
Christiaanse Architects and Planners (KCAP) were new but had extensive experience of masterplan-
ning across Europe, including the Hafen City development in Hamburg, a regeneration project of
commensurate scale.
The timing of the launch meant that the LMF could proceed in tandem with the design of the
Olympic Park between 2008 and mid-2011, enabling park designs to be informed by emerging legacy
strategies, and, thus in theory helping to minimize the need for reworkings of infrastructure and
venues later. It was expected that three years would be enough to develop the LMF to outline Plan-
ning Application stage – referred to as Stage D by the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) –
enabling planning permission to then be synchronized with the completion of the Olympic Park.
This would, in turn, ensure that detailed design and development could start straight after the
Games, without the hiatus between event and legacy that past Olympic Host cities such as Sydney
and Athens experienced.22
Within this timeframe for the planning application, design development was expected to proceed
through ‘concept design’ stages A-C (as deﬁned by RIBA), leading to the production of two draft
masterplans (named as Output B and C) which formed the basis of extensive stakeholder consul-
tations. The purpose of masterplanning during the earliest stages was, in some respects, to devise
a spatial strategy illustrating the ‘Five Legacy Commitments’ produced by Mayor Ken Livingstone
in 2007 – a future deﬁned in largely spatial terms including quantities of housing (10,000–12,000
homes), parklands (102.5 hectares), and the like)23 – within the areas identiﬁed in the Legacy Trans-
formation Masterplan. But it was also to develop a vision rooted in an understanding of legacy as a
long-term process of transformation.
The timeframe anticipated as necessary for this process was twenty-three years encompassing pre-
Olympic design phases, extending to 2031 – a calculation informed by a range of factors from the
scale of the site and experience from other large-scale projects to GLA policy regarding housing
supply, as masterplanners explained. One important implication of this in terms of regeneration
is clearly that beneﬁts for local people would be a long time coming. A major challenge for design,
as one masterplanner put it, was that, over this timeframe, the ‘contexts of development could sub-
stantially change,’ aﬀecting the feasibility of any spatial development proposals the team might
develop then, including ones devised in response to high-level commitments.24
For example, the political context could change substantially given the four-yearly election cycles
associated with democratic local, city and national governments with implications for the leadership
of legacy, the status of legacy commitments and wider urban policy contexts. The broadly cyclical
yet also substantially unpredictable, crisis-prone economic contexts shaping land and real estate
values could have a strong bearing on the pace of capitalist development, as clearly suggested by
the unfolding impacts of the 2008 credit crunch on the building industry. The transforming
6 J. DAVIS
socio-economic context of East London as much as the global property market could impact on the
landscape of needs and demands that development would respond and appeal to. In turn, techno-
logical innovations related to infrastructure, transport and construction could shape development in
multiple but not yet foreseeable ways.
Uncertainty relating to these contexts and future processes led masterplanners to recognize, as
stated in the Output C LMF, that ‘[i]t is impossible to determine a perfect land use or development
scenario that will be realised over the course of the next 30 years or longer’.25 Thus, rather than
regarding the LMF as a means to ﬁx future forms in the manner of traditional masterplans, they
saw a need to develop a framework within which diﬀerent kinds and forms of development could
unfold over time, shaped by evolving development contexts.
The strategy was informed by ideas emerging particularly in the context of KCAP’s practice in
response to issues of segregation and exclusion in contemporary urbanism worldwide, leading to
the production of what they deﬁned as ‘closed city’ forms and processes. In contrast, the ‘open
city’ denotes urban spaces that are shaped over time, not just by top-down forces but by hybrid
social actors, and that are also spatially permeable and inclusive.26 These notions reﬂect a wider
emphasis in contemporary urban design theory on ideas of the city as continually made rather
than ever ﬁnished, on the importance of recognizing the contingencies inherent to planned futures
and on the need to understand how processes rather than just static urban morphology are shaped by
design.27 Of course, how development would unfold within the LMF would, in reality, depend on
how diﬀerent needs and interests were recognized and future procurement processes managed –
on the extent to which the vision of an ‘open city’ became embedded in (neoliberal) legacy govern-
ance as well as design strategy.
Guided by these ideas, the masterplanning strategy involved setting out a range of suitably broad
concepts and principles related to regeneration including building upon the future ‘inheritance’ of
the Olympics (Figure 2), drawing inspiration from the site’s naturally riverine topography to create
a ‘Water City’, establishing the general location and grain of six new neighbourhoods and deﬁning
the public realm including many ‘stitches’ between the site and existing, surrounding communities to
maximize porosity and interconnectivity. These, masterplanners suggested, could guide the emer-
gence of legacy even as development contexts evolved.28
Reﬂecting the expectation to illustrate the Mayor’s Legacy Commitments and develop a spatial
vision while still acknowledging uncertainty, the strategy then involved developing a single, highly
researched and detailed spatial scenario, drawing in the process on a wide array of data including
GLA policy related to city form and housing (tenure, sizes, etc.), guidelines related to development
quality and space standards and population forecasts (which provided an important basis for mod-
elling housing types and social infrastructure). The results of this, in the form of an ‘Illustrative Mas-
terplan’, detailed drawings and perspectival visualizations, are clearly products of their time, strongly
reﬂecting the vision of compact urbanism promoted in the context of wider ‘Urban Renaissance’ pol-
icy by the GLA and Labour Government (Figure 3).29 In presenting them at public consultation
events, masterplanners were clear that, while they illustrated ‘preferred’ outcomes of research and
engagement with stakeholders and consultants, the site was ‘unlikely to be quite like that in the
end.’30 However, their production in the context of the Outputs B and C LMFs created an important
basis for consensus-building over the possible nature of the future among diﬀerent stakeholders,
oﬀered a ‘present future’ for people to react to in the context of public consultation events and
enabled sound evidence of the site’s potential to be provided,31 helping in turn to achieve, as
Smith puts it, a ‘de-risking’ of the site for prospective, private-sector investors and, in other ways,
to drive design processes associated with the market-led future forwards.32
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But the anticipated long-term nature of the regeneration process also focussed masterplanners’
attention on envisioning how it might unfold over time. How the process was broadly conceptualized
is conveyed in a series of diagrams in both iterations of the LMF that position legacy-making tem-
porally in relation to historical processes of transformation. These illustrate a narrative extending
from the industrial past through troubling issues of decline and obsolescence into a future charac-
terized as a return to growth through transition to a post-industrial economy and as rehabilitated
landscapes and communities. Clearly their purpose was to explain the nature of the development
being catalyzed by the Olympics and portray it as a better future for East London.
Elsewhere, the process is portrayed in terms of more explicit timings and time sequences. These
reﬂect a range of considerations encompassing those connected to the overall timeframe as discussed
above plus others including the impacts on surrounding communities, understandings of the plan-
ning and development process, and the LDA’s plans for redeeming debt in land acquisition and the
Figure 2. Diagram illustrating the Olympic ‘Inheritance’ (author, 2017).
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Games over time. As explained in Output C, following anticipated planning permission based on the
LMF in 2011, processes of phased procurement and development would begin straight after the
Games. The ﬁrst phase, it suggests (2012–2015) would involve infrastructural ‘stitches’ to surround-
ing neighbourhoods and the conversion of venues, concentrating attention on ﬁrming these up
within the Legacy Transformation masterplan. Reﬂecting understandings of the time needed for pro-
curement and detailed design following outline planning permission, the development of most of the
neighbourhoods would occur in a second phase between 2015 and 2025. The development of the
ﬁnal neighbourhood south of the main Olympic Stadium would occur in a third phase between
2020 and 2031, its form being contingent on the outcomes of planning for major rail infrastructure
in the area. In other words, the tempo of planning and development related to diﬀerent areas and
across the whole period could be quite varying. Each of the phases would, of course, encompass
many stages of design, consultation, planning and construction, to be determined with greater
knowledge in the future.
Figure 3. LMF Output C diagram illustrating the anticipated temporality of urban change, titled ‘Field Evolution –
Template for Change’. Source: The London Development Agency.
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Alongside this outline phasing strategy, the LMF presents a range of other ideas related to devel-
opment sequencing. For example, it suggests that the provision of social infrastructure would unfold
in line with population growth, anticipated to reach 16,000 by 2031, suggesting a rhythm of public
investment connected to market-led growth. To ensure that the character of the neighbourhoods
would begin to register from the beginning, it suggests that development should encompass a mix
of uses from the start (rather than, say, focussing on diﬀerent land uses in diﬀerent phases). However,
it also indicates that, in the earliest phases, residential development could concentrate on delivering
market housing in order to ‘balance out’ the existing housing proﬁle of Stratford and the Lower Lea
Valley, creating an uneven tempo of change relating to diﬀerent tenures.33 Bringing forward the
development of market housing in the face of recognized, historic ‘unmet need’ for aﬀordable hous-
ing, especially for families, within the Host Boroughs34 clearly reﬂects a cautious debt redemption
strategy but also a classically neoliberal policy of creating economic development incentives and
attracting the ‘creative class.’35 It is diﬃcult to see how this chimes with the idea of an ‘open city’;
it points merely, perhaps, to how complex designs are often an amalgam of not fully reconciled ideas.
One of the problems of phased development is that some sites can remain empty and unused even
as others develop, here potentially aﬀecting the image of legacy. In response, masterplanners pro-
posed a strategy to ensure that all sites would be animated from the start though a mix of permanent
and transitional development. As a result, as one masterplanner put it, regeneration would encom-
pass ‘a spaghetti of durations’ of both construction and use, and this could create opportunities for a
diverse range of place-shapers.36 Transitional uses might appear and fade in quite rapid succession,
while permanence might emerge at a steadier beat. They might have a seasonal character like fairs
and even ‘rotate’ around the site, rather more like crops, said one EDAWmasterplanner.37 Elements
of transitional use could, as suggested in Figure 4, even be imagined continue into the 2050s by which
time older areas of the site could be entering new phases of renewal. They would form part of a pro-
cess of ‘cultivating’ the character of the diﬀerent neighbourhoods, as Allies andMorrison’s Bob Allies
put it.38
Following the Output C consultations in February 2009, all seemed set for an early completion of
the planning application. But, more or less throughout the production of Outputs B and C, the
broader political landscape of London was changing. Mayoral elections on 1 May 2008 (just ﬁve
months after the launch of the LMF) led to the appointment of the Conservative candidate Boris
Johnson as Mayor, in place of Livingstone. Shortly after Output C was launched, with all its detailed
analyses based on supposedly current policy and data, the draft of a new London Plan was released.
Further uncertainty lay on the horizon in terms of the upcoming 2010 General Election and the long-
term governance of the site. In other words, the LMF’s ‘present future’was almost immediately out of
step with the wider political context and promised to become more so, pointing to the diﬃculty of
anticipating one year ahead in contexts of complex urban governance let alone twenty-three.
The Legacy Communities Scheme, 2010–2012
Following his appointment, Johnson began to instigate a review of ﬁnances associated with the
Olympic legacy, a process used politically to support the creation of a new ‘special purpose legacy
vehicle’ in the form of the Olympic Park Legacy Corporation (OPLC) in November 2009, in
place of the LDA (which was, shortly after, abolished altogether).39 Labour Peer Baroness Margaret
Ford and Andrew Altman were appointed respectively as its Chair and Chief Executive, both bring-
ing new perspectives and experiences of large-scale development led by private organizations to bear
on legacy planning. These appointments, and very name of the OPLC, reﬂected Johnson’s aim of
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creating a ﬁnancially independent and even more commercially-oriented organization than the LDA
at the start of an era of economic austerity following the ﬁnancial crisis and of new Conservative
government in London.
Following consultations on Output C (which were in February 2009), LMF design was suspended.
A window of time was then created for the new OPLC to be established and undertake a review of
what had been produced. Its critique focussed, not surprisingly, on the logics and policy context
underpinning the scenario plans. In a foreshadowing of the Brexit-politics of recent times, the com-
pact urban forms shown in these plans were not only seen as hallmarks of the Livingstone era which
Londoners had voted against but as ‘overly European’, as the new CEO put it.40 Though local people
at public consultations had commented on a wide range of aspects of the proposals, comments made
regarding the image of the city were portrayed as key concerns and used to support these directions,
reﬂecting a curious alliance of elites with largely marginalized citizens. The result was the initiation of
a process to create an alternative spatial vision, as a ‘piece of city’ more rooted in ‘London’s historic
DNA’, as ODA Design Advisor Ricky Burdett put it.41 This of course suggested a major revision of
the LMF scenario plans but, at the same time, highlighted the accuracy of masterplanners’ antici-
pation of shifts in the process and politics of regeneration over time.
In January 2010, the OPLC launched a design charette aimed at exploring the potential translation
of these new ideas onto the site and better ‘characterising the place’ in the CEO’s view than had been
Figure 4. LMF Output C Characterization of one of the legacy neighbourhoods. Source: The London Development
Agency.
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achieved previously.42 The process involved scrutinizing existing practices within the consortium as
well as involving a range of new ﬁrms including Caruso St. John and Witherford Watson Mann
(Figure 5). The result was the dismissal of Dutch KCAP, demotion of internationalist AECOM,
and enrolment of the new ﬁrms within a refashioned consortium led by A&M. Explaining
KCAP’s dismissal, an A&M masterplanner relayed how ‘the typologies KCAP promoted were, in
the historicist environment surrounding the early days of the OPLC, seen to be not London.’43
The legacy masterplan was relaunched as the Legacy Communities Scheme (LCS) planning appli-
cation in late 2010. By this time, the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government was
in place at national level and had approved the strategy. Despite the new name, design development
was not returned to RIBA Stage A but rather began at Stage D, suggesting that, while major changes
would be taken on board, earlier work – and all the public funds invested in it – would not be squan-
dered. The decision reﬂected the OPLC’s need to show that legacy was still on course at a time of
criticism relating to escalating costs associated with the Olympics, tales of mismanagement associ-
ated with the LDA and change in design directions. It also reﬂected the diminishing timeframe before
the opening of the Games and a continued recognition of the importance of securing planning per-
mission and ‘going to market’ before then.44
Figure 5. LMF Charette Characterization of one of the revised legacy neighbourhoods by Caruso St. John. Source:
The Olympic Park Legacy Company.
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The overall timeframe anticipated for developing the urban legacy remained broadly the same in
the context of the LCS as in the LMF, reﬂecting ongoing understandings of the time required not just
to develop but also to build value and redeem debt (though debt related to land acquisition was writ-
ten oﬀ by the Government in 2010). As a result, despite the OPLC’s emphasis on creating a new
image of legacy, the challenge of designing for a process materializing over eighteen years remained
signiﬁcant for legacy leaders and masterplanners.
The strategy adopted in the LCS echoes the LMF, suggesting that, despite KCAP’s disappearance,
the ‘open city remained embedded in the intellectual framing of the masterplan’ as one masterplan-
ner put it, at least in broad terms.45 The LCS Design and Accessibility Statement sets out a similar
conceptual framework, involving the creation of six new ‘communities’ set around the park and
along waterways, and of those being functionally ‘diverse’ and spatially ‘inclusive’.46 Throughout
the rest of the LCS, ﬂexibility is created through the identiﬁcation of zones and ranges pertaining
to land-use ﬂoorspace, density, tenures and the like, rather than ﬁxed spaces and development
amounts. This is illustrated in the ‘Parameter Plan’ in Figure 6, one of a number of such drawings
that, rather than deﬁning form, establishes ‘limits of deviation’, maximum heights and general use
mixes. As the Director of Design at the LLDC (which superseded the OPLC in 2012) explained:
‘We’re not predicating exact outcomes. [As a masterplan, it’s therefore] a diﬀerent kind of animal
to the traditional, right we’re going to draw this out and this is exactly how we want to see the blocks
coming forward.’47
The beneﬁt is that it would allow outcomes to be ﬁne-tuned, particularly in the context of nego-
tiations between the OPLC and developers after the Games. It hence reﬂects a strategy of letting
future private-sector actors’ assessments of what is economically viable determine outputs within
a general regulatory framework.48 In this regard, it chimes with the principle laid out in the National
Planning Policy Framework then in development (and which was launched in the same year as the
ﬁnal planning application version of the LCS) that planning policy should not impede the tempo of
development at a time of ‘sluggish’ recovery following the economic downturn.49 But the risk was
clearly that key elements of regeneration legacy, such as aﬀordable housing, could now not just be
delivered in diﬀerent ways but potentially be watered down in order to boost the proﬁtability of
development.
Despite this ﬂexibility, the OPLC’s goal with regard to urban form and character is clear elsewhere
in the form of detailed neighbourhood plans and visualizations that, in the manner of the LMF scen-
arios, illustrate their preferences with regard to the future.50 The general distribution of development
in the LCS ‘Illustrative Masterplan’ is similar to the equivalent LMF drawing, though diﬀerences
include a greater emphasis on terraced typologies rather than perimeter blocks, the incorporation
of the costly ArcelorMittal Orbit championed by Boris Johnson and the loss of housing around
the Olympic Stadium. The major diﬀerence however lies in the vertical dimension as a low-to-
mid-rise (typically 3–6 stories) rather than mid-to-high-rise (typically 8–10 stories) topography is
portrayed, reﬂecting the new neo-conservative nostalgia for Georgian and Victorian housing and
diminished concern with maximizing the housing legacy and fulﬁlling Livingstone’s commitments
in this regard. The purpose of the scenarios was to put possibilities in the minds of prospective devel-
opers, ones they might be wise to consider in the context of competitive tenders, while not determin-
ing architectural outcomes as such.
Less attention is given in the LCS to the LMF to of how regeneration might unfold though, none-
theless, an outline strategy for phasing or time sequencing does form part of the planning application
as does a concise statement concerning uses of diﬀerent durations. A key goal regarding the latter
was to secure planning permission on the basis that land-use may evolve through time in response
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Figure 6. LCS Composite Site Plan. Parameter Plan. Source: The Olympic Park Legacy Company.
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to market forces, but not deﬁne the timings or nature of speciﬁc interim uses. The ﬁrst phase of
development, from 2013 to 2015, would encompass ongoing Post-Games Transformation works
and preparatory works connected to the ﬁrst neighbourhood (named as Chobham Manor). The
second, from 2015 to 2021 and third, from 2022 to 2031 would now encompass approximately
equal amounts of development, suggesting a consistent tempo of investment and accumulation
through time. The phases are described in terms of areas of development and land-uses, but not
speciﬁc neighbourhoods or Planning Delivery Zones (PDZs). The aim, masterplanners suggested,
was to suggest that mixed uses should be delivered throughout but allow procurement processes
to determine how development would unfold around the site.
However, similar to the LMF, the LCS suggests that, in spite of ongoing needs for aﬀordable hous-
ing, ‘the over provision of social rented accommodation in Hackney and Tower Hamlets’ gives a jus-
tiﬁcation to balance ‘the overall level of aﬀordable housing’ and concentrate on bringing ‘new people
[to] move into the area.’51 These would be people who would be attracted to the market housing on
oﬀer, inevitably wealthy people given the rocketing house prices in East London, who would be ben-
eﬁciaries of the investment of public funds in design, management, parklands and social infrastruc-
ture. This sheds light on the political meaning of ‘convergence’, a new byword for regeneration
introduced in the LCS that ‘within 20 years the communities who host the Games will have the
same economic chances as their neighbours across London.’52 At a time of change in spatial
terms, it suggests an ongoing emphasis on State-led gentriﬁcation process rather than on addressing
the needs of those living in deprived areas.53
The LSC was submitted to the ODA Planning Decisions Team (ODA PDT) for outline planning
approval on 5 October 2011. By December 2011, the OPLC had been issued a response to its appli-
cation, which included a range of requests for revision and clariﬁcation. The requirements generally
involved the team tightening their deﬁnitions of development and providing clariﬁcations on phas-
ing and interim use strategy. An A&M masterplanner described this as a frustration, reﬂecting how
‘the planners feel that it is their moral responsibility to have certainty [but] lack imagination and
understanding of the capacity for the masterplan to articulate a process rather than a product.’54 Sev-
eral new documents and addenda to existing strategies were submitted in response in February 2012,
though Andrew Altman resisted some requirements based on the team’s belief in the value of main-
taining ﬂexibility.55 This, he explained, would ‘allow development proposals [to be] able to respond
to market conditions’ over an eighteen-year period. This was not just to allow standards and the
beneﬁts of regeneration for local people to be lowered if necessary but to preserve the potential
for them to be high.
All in all, the period of developing the LCS serves to illustrate the dynamic nature of regeneration
as a process, the challenges of masterplanning for the long-term in the context of changing govern-
ance, and both some of the potentials and issues of ﬂexibility. In the ﬁnal section, we look at how
development has unfolded on the site since 2012, focussing on the eﬀectiveness of the LCS in guiding
and facilitating the process and on the ongoing ways in which regeneration has been anticipated.
Building Legacy, 2012–2018 – the future forming
The ODA PDT ﬁnally resolved to grant outline planning permission for the LCS in late July 2012,
enabling it to be synchronized as planned with the opening of the Games. But, just months later, with
the moment of needing to demonstrate that all was on track past, the governance context in which
the LCS had been produced was transformed again with the replacement of the OPLC by the London
Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC). The reason for the shift related to several factors
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including the imminent completion of the ODA’s role within the timeframe of Olympic develop-
ment, creating the practical need for a new planning authority, the re-election of Boris Johnson
as Mayor in 2012, under which authority he sought to gain greater control of the new organization –
leading to the ousting of Margaret Ford and Andrew Altman – and the opportunities created by the
new localism agenda unveiled by the Coalition Government, highlighting the ongoing signiﬁcance of
political cycles for the futures of urban design and development.56
The LLDC was formed as a Mayoral Development Corporation under the Localism Act of 2011,
reﬂecting characteristically Conservative aims to achieve ‘a substantial and lasting shift in power
away from central government’ towards a hybrid set of entities including cities, councils, local
areas and, in this case, a kind of quango.57 As such, its powers went considerably beyond those of
the OPLC to include compulsory purchase and planning authority – including the ability to create
local policy,58 determine planning applications, give listed building and conservation area consent
and declare new conservation areas – as well as the ability to manage a major public asset.
Though the OPLC and LDA had engaged with potential developers and conducted extensive mar-
ket research, the resolution to grant planning permission enabled the procurement process to begin
in earnest, focussing initially on Chobham Manor. Reﬂecting neoliberal faith in competitive pro-
cesses as the means to secure the right combination of quality and value for money, the ﬁrst stage
in the process was a tender for development in accordance with the provisions of the planning per-
mission. Bids were received from consortia of developers and designers, each outlining their
approach to the LCS. Teams were then assessed according to a range of criteria but, reﬂecting the
LLDC interests as estate managers, preference was apparently given to the team that provided the
most ‘economically advantageous’ solution to what the LCS required. The result was the selection
in August 2012 of Chobham Manor LLP, a joint venture between London & Quadrant and Taylor
Wimpey. Their appointed design team comprised established practices in the form of MAKE (mas-
terplanners), PRP, Haworth Tompkins and Karakusevic Carson.
The major signiﬁcance of this, as one LCS masterplanner explained, was that a single developer
was given the right to monopolize the evolution of the whole neighbourhood, excluding other poten-
tial developers and landownership models. As he put it, however plans for Chobham developed from
then on, ‘the sense of lots of diﬀerent interests being expressed in it [as in the vision of the “open
city”] has been lost.’59 The emphasis placed in tender analysis processes on ‘track record’ in turn
reduced the potential for smaller, less established ﬁrms to be involved in detailing tracts of housing
or speciﬁc blocks, leading to greater homogeneity than might otherwise have been the case. As a for-
mer Design Director at the OPLC put it, these matters reﬂected the LLDC’s broader ‘emphasis on
paybackability’ and desire to pursue what they calculated to be the most eﬃcient strategy and
least risky future over the six-year timeframe of development for Chobham (2012 to 2018).60
Following the tendering process, the LLDC entered into negotiation with the chosen team, leading
to the formation of a ‘development partnership’. This involved a contract between the LLDC as
quasi-public landowner-planning authority and Chobham LLP as the private partner to whom it
sold the rights to development. Between them, hence, these two elite partners possessed a suite of
key capacities necessary to eﬀect development, concentrating decision-making power at the localized
interface between them.61 The contract encompassed a new masterplan based on the LCS, a phasing
(time sequencing) plan and agreed timeframe for completion – hence enabling cash ﬂow to be cal-
culated, managed and controlled – set of performance indicators which the partner would be held
to (related, for example, to convergence) and agreements relating to the sale of development and
return of capital receipts to the LLDC, all establishing a legalized basis for delivering the future.
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The LCS along with other documents produced subsequently by the LLDC, such as their Design
Quality Policy and Inclusive Design Standards, required a lot of the development partner, the
LLDC’s Design Director explained. However, as anticipated, ﬂexibility allowed the outcomes to
arise collaboratively, a process that involved drawing on developers’ ideas and expertise rather
than simply ‘bashing them on the head’ with constraints and regulations.62 Chobham LLP, he
said, was asked to consider ‘Lifetime Homes, prototypes for intergenerational living, housing for
older people […] kind of aﬀordable products [and other] things that aren’t provided by the market’
but was then able to devise a delivery strategy themselves through their design team. The risk, of
course, was that the ﬁnancial priorities of both partners would, if in diﬀerent ways, dominate in
‘the politics of the possible,’ to use Raco’s phrase.63
The process of negotiation between the LLDC and the development partner and the translation of
its outcomes into spatial strategy represented a shift from the open-ended future created in the con-
text of the LCS to detailed, more instrumental design for construction. This began with a zonal mas-
terplan for the whole neighbourhood by MAKE Architects, the production of which was
synchronized with Legacy Transformation and the opening of most of the venues to the public. It
was awarded planning permission in 2013 allowing the staged development of separate, more
advanced masterplans for each of three development phases. These plans were awarded planning
permission respectively in January 2013, December 2014 and November 2015. Beyond this planning
stage, plans were of course not ﬁxed in that moment but in a process of continual reﬁnement extend-
ing into the construction phase through exchange between client, planners, designers, consultants
and contractors. Development in Chobham began in 2014 and is on track at the time of writing
for the third phase to commence in 2019.
As the aim of this paper is not to focus on the products of change, suﬃce to say that themasterplans
and the urban form of the ﬁrst development phase as now realized reﬂects much continuity with both
the LCS Parameter Plans and the neighbourhood scenario plans. The resulting architecture with its
townhouse typologies and Georgian proportions is also clearly a product of the OPLC’s turn to histori-
cal precedents, as illustrated in Figure 7. However, recent research has highlighted important divergen-
cies from the LCS such as that while development quality is high, only 28 per cent of housing (as
opposed to the target of 31 per cent subject to viability) was designated as aﬀordable, with important
consequences for the emerging demographics of the legacy ‘community’ (Figure 7).64While this reﬂects
the anticipated process of ‘balancing’ out the tenure split of housing around the site, it is unclear what it
might mean for the aﬀordability of future housing. It may be assumed that this remains contingent on
how housing policy evolves and on the ongoing weight given to viability assessments.
At the time of writing in 2018, the time point at which legacy development is due to be complete
remains 2031 though this has not been consistently the case since 2012. Brieﬂy in 2013, the LLDC
explored the potential to bring the long-established completion date forward to as early as 2023. This
came about as a direction from the Mayor, timed to coincide with the start of his re-election cam-
paign, to demonstrate that, as a senior LLDC planner put it, ‘we haven’t just opened a shiny new park
and […] got a developer whose started on site up in Chobham Manor’65 but might, if re-elected, be
able to alter the tempo of legacy. But, while shortening the timeframe suggested that more develop-
ment could be built earlier, there was a risk of needing to backtrack as development futures for both
venues and sites were far from secure at that time. It was back to 2031 by 2014, reﬂecting recognition
that a failure to meet publicized timings could be damaging to the Mayor and LLDC in the future but
also of ongoing complexities and uncertainties in terms of legacy ﬁnancing and delivery.
Following on from ChobhamManor, the sequencing of development has been driven by procure-
ment processes. The various areas it relates to are shown in Figure 8. To oﬀer a summary, the
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procurement of development for the neighbourhoods of East Wick and Sweetwater followed on from
Chobham in 2015 resulting in the appointment, again, of a single development partner (Balfour
Beatty and Places for People) for this large site (encompassing 20 per cent of all projected
homes). The masterplan by designers Shepherd Robson and Studio Egret West (2016–2018) is
planned to unfold through seven design and development phases between 2019 and 2023, each
led by a diﬀerent team of architects.
The Stratford Waterfront area became the focus of a new zonal masterplan commissioned by the
LLDC in 2015 led by A&M and including architects O’Donnell and Tuomey, Arquitecturia Camps
Felip and others.66 It was planned to unfold in four stages, culminating in a planning application in
2016. Following a now familiar pattern, after the Mayoral elections of May 2016, the timeframe was
extended to enable ﬁrst a review and, then, for major design changes to be carried out in line with
Mayor Sadiq Khan’s new vision for the site, leading one renowned journalist to say it was ‘trapped in
a purgatory of masterplans, consultations and yet more plans.’67 In July 2018, following the recent
release of images of the new designs, submission for planning approval is anticipated for the autumn.
Development is expected to proceed under several contracts with the LLDC, each involving diﬀerent
architects, and to start on site in 2020.
Marshgate became the focus of a development contract between the LLDC and University College
London (UCL) in 2015. StantonWilliam Architects were appointed to produce a masterplan and this
received outline planning permission in May 2018. Four development phases are anticipated, begin-
ning in 2019. Finally, the LLDC commissioned Rick Mather Architects in 2014 to produce a mas-
terplan for Pudding Mill but, in 2016, shelved this and appointed A&M to produce a new one in
theory better suited to the emerging topography of Stratford Waterfront and Marshgate. These tim-
ings are governed by a range of factors including the complexity of the projects, the time seen to
be needed for design, planning and construction, ﬁnancing strategies, allowances for contingency
Figure 7. Present legacy: Street in the Chobham Manor neighbourhood (author, 2018).
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and calculations of risk. In the context of volatility and public-private governance, they highlight the
validity of LCS masterplanners’ reluctance to overly prescribe development sequencing in advance of
procurement, as this cannot be determined with accuracy in the context of market-led regeneration
without the input of the developer.
While the focus of design has been on the permanent development in each of the neighbourhood
areas, there has been eﬀort to cultivate interim uses of diﬀerent durations, reﬂecting the return of
such ideas from the LMF since 2012. A built example, the Mobile Garden City in Chobham
Manor (2015–17) formed a temporary landscape in which local people could learn about gardening
and engage in food growing. It has since moved elsewhere, reﬂecting LMF ideas of rotating uses. A
funfair on Stratford Waterfront created a seasonal attraction reﬂecting, again, earlier ideas concern-
ing the temporality of change. Many more interim uses and pop-ups are planned as part of Stratford
Waterfront and Marshgate developments. Not envisaged at the time of the LMF, however, was that
interim uses would be led by the developers of the permanent architecture. This came about, as one
Figure 8. Neighbourhood areas – location plan (author, 2018).
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former OPLC Design Director explained, because ‘developers saw [interim use] as risk’, so introdu-
cing them depended on them being allowed to control them. As a result, their purpose is now gen-
erally to ‘to give an impression of what’s coming,’68 as the LLDC’s Design Director put it, rather than
to shape future character from the bottom up, hence enabling all times as well as places in the process
of transformation to be converted into commercial opportunities for the development partners.
Coming back brieﬂy to the outcomes of the procurement of ‘permanent’ development, it clear that
the ﬂexibility created through the LCS has, beyond Chobham, continued to enable quite a range of
variations to emerge from what its scenarios (‘present futures’) indicated. As with Chobham, the
masterplan for East Wick and Sweetwater closely follows the LCS, though drops in the number of
aﬀordable homes are here also suggested – to thirty per cent in this case.69
In contrast, plans for StratfordWaterfront andMarshgate have evolved substantially, now focussed
on the production of a major Culture and Education District. East Bank, as the Stratford Waterfront
area has recently been named (though it was Olympicopolis under Boris Johnson), is planned to
accommodate outposts of the Victoria and Albert Museum, Sadler’s Wells Theatre, Smithsonian,
BBC and London College of Fashion, suggesting a reframing of regeneration here around future
uses other than housing and employment (Figure 9). Marshgate is the focus for UCL East, ‘a radical
new model for how a university campus can be embedded in the local community,’70 and a radical
departure too from the largely residential neighbourhood anticipated in the context of the LCS’s scen-
ario plans. Plans for Pudding Mill have indicated very diﬀerent forms and land-uses over the years,
reﬂecting the high level of ﬂexibility set for this area in the LCS (a reﬂection, in turn, of the assumption
that it would be developed last) and its capacity to ‘absorb uses displaced fromother areas,’ as onemas-
terplanner put it (including the loss of residential use from Marshgate).71 Flexibility, hence, has con-
tinued to play an important role in facilitating unanticipated change and achieving Allies and
Morrison’s goal of ‘cultivating’ but not controlling the emerging cityscape.
Plans for these areas, as one senior LLDC manager put it, are ‘very symbolic of the legacy that the
Games has generated in terms of putting this place on the map’ and of how ‘the market has changed
its perception’ of East London.72 Earlier masterplanning has clearly played a vital role in achieving
this, as much by illustrating, guiding and facilitating evolution within the process of long-term
transformation.
Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to explore the planning of London’s Olympic legacy through masterplan-
ning, not in the conventional way in which planning history is often done, by exploring the changing
Figure 9. Stratford Waterfront (East Bank) View, as anticipated in mid-2018. Source: The London Legacy Develop-
ment Corporation.
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content of plans and the relation these bear to development, but by considering the nature of strat-
egies related to the anticipated process of physical regeneration before the Olympics and how, in
turn, design, planning and development process has unfolded since. Adam’s notion of a ‘futurescape’
has been key to this, the various ‘structural elements’ she identiﬁes as vital for understanding futures-
as-processes providing a methodological armature for the account throughout.
As shown in the introductory section, from the time of the Olympic Bid (2003–04), regeneration
in East London was anticipated as a long and complex process – extending over a timeframe of dec-
ades – but one that the Olympics would create the means to accelerate by creating infrastructure and
amenities by way of a ﬁrst, State-led phase of development that would catalyse later investment in
East London. This was seen as crucial for realizing a better future for its residents.
In the section on the LMF, it was shown how planning and development anticipated over twenty-
three led to the production of a range of concepts and strategies for dealing with the uncertainties
inherent to distant futures and envisioning the process of development over time. Of particular sig-
niﬁcance were ideas of ﬂexibility or open-endedness which created potential for the form of the
future to emerge as development contexts evolved over time and which at least some masterplanners
saw as means to allow many rather than few to determine it. However, the LMF suggested that these
could also be interpreted as approaches geared to attracting private development and facilitating
State-led gentriﬁcation.
The following section, which began by exploring the construction of a new ‘present future’ in the
context of the LCS illustrated the contingency of spatial outcomes in the pre-planning phase onongoing
political support and the politics of urban futures and, in this sense the resiliency of ideas of ﬂexibility.
Indeed, although the image of legacy transformed at this point, ﬂexibility continued to be considered
important. This would create scope for the spatial and temporal aspects of development to be ﬁrmed
up after 2012 in phases of negotiation and contractual agreements between the OPLC/LLDC and pri-
vate-sector developers. Hence, it highlighted the extent to which the future was seen to depend on these
judicialised processes and the assessments of commercial viability underpinning them.
In the ﬁnal section, I argued that the LCS’s ﬂexible parameters have not only created scope for
ﬁrming proposals up in line with the shortening timeframe to construction, but for coping with
ongoing change, dynamism and surprise related to both the governance and evolution of market
interests in the site without having to revise or undo planning permissions. Timings to have
remained broadly constant suggesting of course that a great deal of contingency was built in at
the start but also pointing to the role of preparedness through advance planning. However, I also
argued that, through procurement processes, timings as well as outputs have come to be controlled
by a more limited range of actors than once envisioned, reﬂecting desires to streamline development
and manage risks in the crucial delivery phase when capital investment is due to be recovered, but
with consequences for the meanings and process of regeneration.
Overall, the paper has revealed a process both anticipated and unfolding which, in spite of the
various diﬀerent in approach and political orientation which have led to evolution over time,
reﬂect many features of neoliberalism in planning and development and related assumptions
about the mechanisms and objectives of Olympic-led regeneration. But it also reveals the signiﬁcance
of urban design strategies connected to the temporality of urban change.
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